The post-Lisbon role of the European Parliament in the EU's Common Commercial Policy: Implications for bilateral trade negotiations.  EU Diplomacy Paper 05/2012, July 2012 by Richardson, Laura
Department of eU InternatIonal
relatIons anD DIplomacy stUDIes
The post-Lisbon Role of the  
European Parliament in the 
EU’s Common Commercial  
Policy: Implications for  
Bilateral Trade Negotiations
Laura Richardson
EU Diplomacy Paper 05 / 2012 
 
Department of EU International Relations 
and Diplomacy Studies 
 
 
 
EU Diplomacy Papers 
5/2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Post-Lisbon Role of the European Parliament  
in the EU’s Common Commercial Policy:  
Implications for Bilateral Trade Negotiations 
 
Laura Richardson 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Laura Richardson 2012 
 
 
Dijver 11 | BE-8000 Bruges, Belgium | Tel. +32 (0)50 477 251 | Fax +32 (0)50 477 250 | 
E-mail ird.info@coleurop.be | www.coleurope.eu/ird  
   Laura Richardson 
2 
About the Author 
 
Laura  Richardson studied Law and French at Trinity College Dublin (Ireland) and 
International Relations during an exchange programme at Sciences Po, Paris 
(France). In addition, she holds an MA in EU International Relations and Diplomacy 
Studies from the College of Europe in Bruges (Belgium), where she studied in 2011-
2012 with a scholarship from the Irish Department of Education. This paper is based 
on her Master’s thesis submitted at the College of Europe (Marie Skłodowska-Curie 
Promotion). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Editorial Team: 
Andrew Bower, Gino Brunswijck, Francesca Fenton, Grzegorz Grobicki, Sieglinde 
Gstöhl, Vincent Laporte, Jing Men, Raphaël Métais, Charles Thépaut, Claudia Zulaika 
Escauriaza 
Dijver 11 | BE-8000 Bruges, Belgium | Tel. +32 (0)50 477 251 | Fax +32 (0)50 477 250 | 
E-mail info.ird@coleurope.eu | www.coleurope.eu/ird  
Views expressed in the EU Diplomacy Papers are those of the authors only and do 
not necessarily reflect positions of either the series editors or the College of Europe. EU Diplomacy Paper 5/2012 
  3 
Abstract 
 
This paper sets out to conduct an empirical analysis of the post-Lisbon role of the 
European Parliament  (EP)  in the EU’s Common Commercial Policy through an 
examination of the ‘deep and comprehensive’ bilateral Free Trade Agreements 
(FTAs) currently negotiated as part of the EU’s Global Europe strategy. The EU-Korea 
and EU-India FTAs are used as case studies in order to determine the implications of 
the  EP’s enhanced trade powers on the processes, actors and outcomes of EU 
bilateral trade policy. The EP is now endowed with the ‘hard power’ of consent in the 
ratification phase of FTAs, acting as a threat to strengthen its  ‘soft power’ to 
influence negotiations. The EP is developing strategies to influence the mandate and 
now plays an important role in the implementation of FTAs. The entry of this new 
player on the Brussels trade policy field has brought about a shift in the institutional 
balance of power and opened up the EP as a new point of access for trade policy 
lobbyists. Finally, increased EP involvement in EU trade policy has brought about a 
politicisation of EU trade policy and greater normative outcomes of FTAs.  
 Laura Richardson 
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Introduction 
 
The Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force on 1 December 2009, has changed the 
nature of the EU’s Common Commercial Policy (CCP) through the introduction of a 
new player in the field: the European Parliament (EP). Prior to the entry into force of 
Lisbon, EU trade policy was limited to two actors: the European Commission and the 
Council of Ministers. The Treaty of Lisbon elevates the powers of the EP in the EU’s 
CCP, which has been granted a power of consent1 in the negotiation process of 
international trade agreements. The Commission is now under a legal obligation to 
“report regularly [...] on the progress of negotiations”2 to the International Trade 
Committee of the EP (INTA Committee) and must ensure that “the European 
Parliament shall be immediately and fully informed at all stages of the procedure”.3 
Finally, the EP now also plays a new role alongside the Council in the adoption of 
“the measures defining the framework for implementation of the Common 
Commercial Policy”.4 
This paper seeks to establish the implications of the post-Lisbon role of the EP for EU 
bilateral trade negotiations. An implication can be defined as “the conclusion that 
can be drawn from something although it is not explicitly stated”, such as “likely 
consequences” or “the action or state of being involved in something”.5 A number 
of studies have been published on the institutional changes brought about in the 
field of EU CCP by the Lisbon Treaty,6 however empirical analyses remain limited. 
                                                 
1 European Union, “Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union”, Official Journal of the European Union, C83/47, 30 
May 2010, Art. 218(6) TFEU (European Union 1). 
2 Ibid., Art. 207(3) TFEU.  
3 Ibid., Art. 218(10) TFEU.  
4 Ibid., Art. 207(2) TFEU. 
5 Oxford Dictionaries, “Implication”, retrieved 30 March 2012, http://oxforddictionaries.com/ 
definition/implication?q=implication 
6  See  A. Pollet-Fort, “Implications of the Lisbon Treaty on EU  External Trade Policy”, 
Background Brief, no. 2, EU Centre Singapore, March 2010 (Pollet-Fort 1); M. Krajewski, “The 
Reform of the Common Commercial Policy”, in A. Biondi and P. Eeckhout (eds.). European 
Union Law after the Treaty of Lisbon, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011; S. Woolcock, “The 
Potential Impact of the Lisbon Treaty on European Union Trade Policy”, SIEPS European Policy 
Analysis,  no. 8, Stockholm,  Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (SIEPS), 2008 
(Woolcock 1); S. Woolcock, “The Treaty of Lisbon and the European Union as an Actor in 
International Trade”, ECIPE Working Paper, no.1, Brussels, European Centre for International 
Political Economy (ECIPE), 2010 (Woolcock 2); S. Woolcock, European Economic Diplomacy, 
Farnham, Ashgate, 2012 (Woolcock 3); S. Woolcock, “EU Trade and Investment Policymaking 
after the Treaty of Lisbon”, Brussels, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), 2010 
(Woolcock 4). EU Diplomacy Paper 5/2012 
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Therefore, this paper sets out to investigate the substantial implications which the 
enhanced post-Lisbon role of the EP has on the processes, actors and outcomes of 
EU bilateral trade policy.  
The EP is now endowed with the ‘hard power’ of consent in the ratification phase of 
Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), which acts as a sufficient threat to strengthen the EP’s 
‘soft power’ to influence negotiations. While the treaty does not grant the EP any 
formal powers in the drafting of the negotiating directives, the Parliament is 
developing strategies to influence the mandate. The EP now also plays an important 
role in the implementation of FTAs through the ordinary legislative procedure (OLP). 
The entry of this new player on the trade policy field has brought about a shift in the 
balance of power between the EP, the Council and the Commission. In addition, the 
enhanced powers of the EP in the post-Lisbon era have opened it up as a new point 
of access for trade policy lobbyists. Finally, the post-Lisbon era is characterised by i) a 
politicisation of EU trade policy whereby the EP defends the interests of European 
citizens and industries in FTA negotiations, and ii) greater normative outcomes of FTAs 
as the EP is in possession of greater power and tools to translate the social agenda of 
the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) and civil society into EU trade agreements.  
 
The ‘Global Europe’ Strategy 
 
This paper focuses on the role of the EP in the EU’s renewed and vigorous bilateral 
trade policy. Negotiations of FTAs with ‘strategic’ Asian partners, notably South Korea 
and India, are used as case studies in order to evaluate the extent of the EP’s role in 
FTA negotiations. These two trade agreements belong to the new generation of FTAs, 
set out in the EU’s 2006 strategy:  “Global Europe  –  Competing in the World; A 
Contribution to the EU’s Growth and Jobs Strategy”, which are “comprehensive and 
ambitious in coverage”7 and one of the first areas in which a parliamentary influence 
is notable in EU trade policy.  
The  FTA  between the EU and the Republic of Korea is  the  first  to be concluded 
between the EU and a ‘strategic partner’. Negotiations were launched in May 2007 
in Seoul, initialled by both sides on 15 October 2009, and closed prior to the entry into 
                                                 
7 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions, Global Europe: Competing in the World. A Contribution to the EU’s Growth and Jobs 
Strategy”, COM(2006) 567, Brussels, 4 October 2006, p. 9 (hereafter Global Europe). Laura Richardson 
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force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009. However, the agreement was only 
signed by the Council on 6 October 2010 and hence the post-Lisbon legal 
framework applied. This means that while the EP’s role in the pre-Lisbon negotiations 
of the FTA remained limited, the agreement could only come into force subject to EP 
ratification,8 which brought about a whole “new political reality”9 to the negotiations 
and proved challenging for  the Commission  and  the Council,  as well as the EP. 
Seeing as it was the first time the EP was exercising its right of consent for a bilateral 
trade agreement, the FTA proved to be a ‘test case’, whereby the Parliament had a 
new veto power and wanted to demonstrate that it could exercise it effectively.  
While the role of the EP in the EU-South Korea FTA was limited to the final consent and 
implementation procedures, the FTA between the EU and India, the negotiations of 
which were launched in June 2007 but have not yet been concluded, serves as a 
case study in order to assess the extent of the European Parliament’s power in the 
FTA negotiation  phase. The Parliament’s involvement remains limited to a right of 
information and access to documents from the Commission, however, on the basis 
of these disclosures, the EP is gradually developing strategies to exert pressure on 
negotiators. Furthermore, while Korea is an industrialised and small country, India has 
an emerging  and increasingly competitive  economy,  a huge market as well as 
important development concerns. Thus, the EU-India FTA negotiations have already 
proved and are likely to be more politically controversial than the EU-Korea FTA, with 
MEPs facing both greater industry and NGO pressures. Hence, while the EU-South 
Korea FTA acts as a benchmark demonstrating a “strong footprint of parliamentary 
influence”,10 the Parliament is likely to leave  an even deeper mark on the final 
outcome of the EU-India FTA, if the agreement is to be concluded. 
 
The Negotiation Process  
 
This section will set the scene by conducting an analysis of the extent of the Lisbon 
Treaty’s  institutional changes to the EP for each step of EU bilateral trade 
negotiations, in order to determine when EP plays the most strategic role.  
 
                                                 
8 European Union 1, op.cit., Art. 218(6) TFEU.  
9 Interview with Commission official, European Commission, Brussels, 20 April 2012.  
10 J. Hillman & D. Kleimann, “Trading Places: The New Dynamics of EU Trade Policy under the 
Treaty of Lisbon”, GMF Economic Policy Paper, German Marshall Fund, Washington D.C., 
October 2010, p. 6. EU Diplomacy Paper 5/2012 
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Mandate 
Prior and subsequent to the Lisbon Treaty, the EP’s role in delimiting the Commission’s 
negotiation mandate is essentially non-existent. The adoption of the EU negotiating 
directive remains in the hands of two players: the Commission and the Council. The 
Commission “shall make recommendations to the Council, which shall authorise the 
Commission to open the necessary negotiations”.11 The EP, however, would like to 
see its role increase in this first stage of trade negotiations because if it cannot play a 
role in setting the EU’s objectives, “it has little prospect of influencing the EU during a 
negotiation”.12 Hence, in its 2011 Resolution on a New Trade Policy for Europe under 
the 2020 Strategy, the EP “reminds the Commission and the Council to take seriously 
into account Parliament’s views when deciding about the mandates.”13  
In the case of the EU-Korea and EU-India FTAs, the draft negotiating mandates were 
determined pre-Lisbon;  yet  copies, classified as ‘Restreint UE’ documents, were 
issued to a limited audience in the INTA secretariat. This small group of MEPs could 
have held a meeting in order to formulate  certain suggestions, however,  the 
exclusivity of the group remains controversial and for this reason, INTA has “not been 
able to agree on a procedure that would give more power to a small number of 
MEPs as compared to the rest”.14  
A ‘window of opportunity’ opened up for EP involvement in the determination of the 
draft negotiating directives of the investment chapters of the EU-India FTA. The Lisbon 
Treaty  brings  foreign  direct  investment  under the umbrella of EU exclusive 
competence15 and it has subsequently taken some time for the Commission, Council 
and EP to establish how they want the EU’s common investment policy to come into 
operation. In order to discuss the Parliament’s views on the matter, a meeting was 
held between the Commission and a limited number of INTA Committee members.16 
However, the controversial nature of the exclusive group again posed a problem 
and meant that it was unable to present a position on these chapters on behalf of 
the whole Parliament.  
                                                 
11 European Union 1, op.cit., Art. 207(3) TFEU. 
12 Woolcock 3, op.cit., p. 54.  
13 European Parliament, Resolution of 27 September 2011 on a New Trade Policy for Europe 
under the 2020 Strategy, 2010/2152(INI), Brussels, final version 29 April 2012, point 14.   
14 Commission official, op.cit.  
15 European Union 1, op.cit., Art. 207(1) TFEU. 
16 Commission official, op.cit. Laura Richardson 
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The EP may also influence the negotiating mandate by adopting a resolution before 
the FTA negotiations begin. The EP has not yet managed to issue a resolution in sync 
with the adoption of a negotiating mandate by the Council; however it seems that 
this may happen soon in the case of the EU-Japan FTA. 17 In addition, prior to 
negotiations,  all FTAs are subject to a ‘scoping exercise’  during  which  the 
Commission opens discussions with the EP, the Council, concerned businesses, NGOs 
and civil society, in order to determine the scope, depth and level of ambition of the 
negotiations. Through this evaluation, the Commission attempts to gage whether the 
conditions are there for a successful agreement and a win-win situation. During this 
‘scoping exercise’, the EP is consulted and is able to express its views, concerns and 
red lines to the Commission and Council.   
 
Negotiations 
Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, the EP played no official role in the negotiation phase of EU 
bilateral trade agreements. Under the pre-Lisbon framework, the Commission was to 
“conduct these negotiations in consultation with [the  Council’s  Trade Policy 
Committee (TPC)] [… and] report regularly to [it] on the progress of negotiations”.18 
To remedy the legal vacuum of EP absence, an informal agreement known as the 
“Luns-Westerterp” procedure was developed between the Commission  and EP, 
stipulating that the former would inform and consult the latter when negotiating 
trade agreements.19 The EP could then issue an opinion or resolution on the matter; 
however,  these  were mostly disregarded as they were not backed by any ‘hard 
power’.  
In 2005, in anticipation of its enhanced powers, a specialist INTA Committee  was 
established  in the EP. Under the provisions of a 2005  Framework Agreement  on 
Relations between the Commission and the European Parliament, the Commission 
committed to “provide early and clear information to Parliament both during the 
phase of preparation of the agreements and during the conduct and conclusion of 
international negotiations  [...]  in sufficient time for [the Parliament] to be able to 
express its point of view if appropriate, and for the Commission to be able to take 
                                                 
17 Ibid. 
18 European Union, “Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on the European Union and of the 
Treaty Establishing the European Community”, Official Journal of the European Union, C321 
E/1, 29 December 2006, Art. 133(3) TEC, (European Union 2). 
19 Woolcock 3, op.cit., p. 56. EU Diplomacy Paper 5/2012 
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Parliament’s views as far as possible into account”.20 This flow of information has 
taken place principally between the Commission and the INTA Committee, in 
particular its ‘apolitical’ secretariat as opposed to party groups, on a limited and 
confidential basis.  
In the post-Lisbon era, the Commission is now under a duty to “report [...] to the 
European Parliament on the progress of negotiations”.21 In addition, the “European 
Parliament shall be immediately and fully informed at all stages of the procedure”22 
of the negotiations  and conclusion of international trade agreement.  Dialogue 
between the Commission and INTA has been stepped up and the latter can “voice 
its political preferences and flag red lines and preconditions for its final consent early 
on, [through]  the use of non-binding parliamentary resolutions, hearings, opinions, 
[…] and questions to the Commission”.23 Parliamentary resolutions can now be used 
by the EP as strategic ultimatums, setting the ‘conditions’ of parliamentary consent to 
a particular FTA. Professor V. Moreira, Chairman  of the INTA Committee, refers  to 
these EP instruments as the Parliament’s “soft power”24 to influence the direction and 
content of negotiations. 
In order to ensure that the INTA Committee is properly informed and has an overall 
comprehension of  the progress of negotiations, the Commission and Parliament 
considerably  updated their Framework Agreement  in 2010.  The cooperation 
document now stipulates that “the Commission guarantees that it will apply the 
basic principle of equal treatment for Parliament and the Council, especially as 
regards access to meetings and the provision of contributions or other information”25 
and that “Parliament shall be immediately and fully informed at all stages of the 
negotiation and conclusion of international agreements, including the definition of 
                                                 
20 European Communities, “Framework Agreement on the Relations between the European 
Parliament and the Commission”, Official Journal of the Communities  C117E/123, 18 May 
2006, p. 5.  
21 European Union 1, op.cit., Art. 207(3) TFEU.  
22 Ibid., Art. 218(10) TFEU.  
23 D.  Kleimann, “Taking Stock: EU Common Commercial Policy in the Lisbon Era”, CEPS 
Working Document, no. 346, Brussels, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), April 2011, 
p. 7.  
24 Interview with MEP Professor V. Moreira, Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and 
Democrats, Chairman of the INTA Committee, European Parliament, Brussels, 27 April 2012. 
25 European Union, “Framework Agreement on Relations between the European Parliament 
and the European Commission”, Official Journal of the European Union, L 304/47, 20 
November 2010, p. 3.  Laura Richardson 
10 
negotiation directives”. 26  In order to comply with the  Framework  Agreement’s 
provisions, the Trade Commissioner regularly meets with MEPs, attends and speaks 
before INTA Committee hearings both publicly and in camera, the Director General 
attends in camera meetings with the INTA Committee every two months to keep its 
members informed on the progress of various FTA negotiations, and informal sessions 
are organised between Directorate-General (DG) TRADE and the responsible INTA 
members to discuss particularly contentious trade issues.  
The Chairman of INTA is of the opinion that the legal duty to provide information to 
the Committee is being fully complied with by the Commission.27 Liberalist MEPs in 
favour of DG TRADE’s agenda and sharing good relations with the latter declared 
that they receive all the same documents as the TPC. Green and Left-wing MEPs 
were more critical of the Commission, as they remain disappointed by the selective 
and vague nature of the  information disclosed  to them, which only contains the 
“broad brushstrokes”28 of FTA negotiations. As negotiating red lines need to be kept 
secret from the trading partner,  sensitive documents such as draft negotiating 
guidelines are classified ‘Restreint UE’ and subject to an agreement between DG 
TRADE and the INTA Chair whereby they are only granted to a select number of INTA 
Committee members. While highly comprehensible, this precaution, however, does 
limit the capacity of the INTA Committee to be cohesively and effectively involved in 
the EU’s bilateral trade negotiation process.  
 
Ratification 
Up until the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, for political rather than legal reasons, 
the EP was asked for its assent to all trade agreements, including FTAs. This, however, 
remained a mere formality as the EP lacked any authority, technical expertise and 
access to documents to make an informed and credible choice of dissent. As a 
result, the “Commission and the Council went through the motions of consulting the 
EP, but were seldom much constrained in their policy options.”29  
The most momentous expansion of the EP’s powers in EU bilateral trade negotiations 
is its newly acquired veto power over  FTAs, subsequent to Council signature. EP 
                                                 
26 Ibid., p. 4. 
27 Prof. Moreira, op.cit. 
28 Telephone interview with MEP Paul Murphy, Confederal Group of the European United Left-
Nordic Green Left, Member of the INTA Committee, 7 March 2012.  
29 Woolcock 1, op.cit., p. 4.  EU Diplomacy Paper 5/2012 
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consent is now required for “agreements covering fields to which […] the ordinary 
legislative procedure applies”30 and this includes the CCP.31 Hence, FTAs negotiated 
by the Commission are now subject to parliamentary consent by simple majority.  
If the EP was to ‘say no’ to a bilateral trade deal, this would cause great harm to the 
EU’s relations with the concerned third country and its international relations more 
generally. In the case of FTAs, the EP has not yet exercised this “nuclear option”32  but 
has used it as a threat to ensure its concerns are taken into account. Indeed, the 
threat of veto can play an almost equally important role as the outright voting down 
of an agreement. This is evident in the case of the EU-Korea FTA. In the final stages of 
the negotiation process of this agreement, “a consistent fear was voiced by DG 
TRADE  officials that the European Parliament would scupper the agreement”. 33 
Under fierce lobbying by the European automobile industry, the EP used its veto 
threat to ensure the Commission included a  strong  ‘safeguard clause’  to protect 
European small car producers. 
A key implication of the post-Lisbon EP role in the ratification phase of the EU-Korea 
FTA was its success in delaying provisional application of the agreement.34 Like many 
bilateral trade agreements, the EU-Korea FTA is a mixed agreement which required 
ratification by national parliaments on aspects falling under national competence 
(such as cooperation in cultural matters or provisions relating to the criminal 
enforcement of intellectual property rights35). Under the pre- and post-Lisbon legal 
frameworks, “the Council, on a proposal by the negotiator, shall adopt a decision 
authorising the signing of the agreement and, if necessary, its provisional application 
before entry into force”.36 Hence, the Treaty stipulates that the EP is only seized and 
called to vote on the FTA after it has already been provisionally applied. In the EU-
Korea FTA negotiations, the EP successfully secured a guarantee whereby the 
Commission would ask the Council not to provisionally apply the agreement until it 
                                                 
30 European Union 1, op.cit., Art 218(6) TFEU.  
31 Ibid., Art. 207(2) TFEU.  
32 C. Stevens & P. Goodison, “The Lisbon Treaty: Implications for ACP-EU trade and trade 
negotiations”, Commonwealth Trade Hot Topics Issue 77, June 2006, p. 3.  
33 G. Siles-Brügge, “Resisting Protectionism after the Crisis: Strategic Economic Discourse and 
the EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement”, New Political Economy, vol. 16, no. 5, November 2011, 
p. 645.  
34 Commission official, op.cit.  
35 A. Pollet-Fort, “The EU-Korea FTA and its implications for the future EU-Singapore FTA”, 
Background Brief No.4, EU Centre in Singapore, June 2011, p. 14 (Pollet-Fort 2).  
36 European Union 1, op.cit., Art. 218(5) TFEU.  Laura Richardson 
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was granted parliamentary approval.  This political victory is set to act as a 
benchmark for all future FTA negotiations.  
Interviewed  MEPs  confirmed that the Parliament’s power of consent over FTAs 
cannot be perceived as a mere ‘cosmetic institutional change’ and that it is in fact 
a “substantial”37 or even “atomic power”.38 Indeed, since the Parliament has been 
granted this veto power,  the Commission “is much keener to discuss with the 
Parliament”39 on trade issues and is often “not frightened [...] but quite nervous about 
the European Parliament’s powers”.40 The criticism voiced by all MEPs is that while the 
EP’s veto power acts as a credible threat, in the end it is restricted to saying ‘yes or 
no’ and this brings about a degree of frustration.  
 
Implementation and Monitoring 
Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, the EP has not vested any powers in the “shaping and 
adoption of EU legislation defining the framework for implementing trade policy.”41 
Such legislation was adopted “using the consultation procedure in which the 
Commission proposals were adopted by the Council through regulations with only, at 
best, a brief consultation with the European Parliament”.42 Now, the Lisbon Treaty 
stipulates that both the Council and EP have legislative powers in this field and shall 
“in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure  [...]  adopt the measures 
defining the framework for implementing the common commercial policy.”43  
Hence, the EP’s role in EU trade policy-making is significantly increased as it is vested 
with an oversight power in the implementation of trade agreements and trade 
remedy legislation. Such trade remedies include safeguard clauses such as the one 
in the EU-Korea FTA, which the EP wanted to see reinforced before it gave its final 
consent to the agreement. It will be interesting to see how the EP uses its political 
clout in the implementation phase in order to maximise its influence over the 
outcome of future FTAs. 
                                                 
37 Telephone interview with MEP Franziska Keller, Group of Greens/European Free Alliance, 
Member of the Development Committee, 15 March 2012. 
38 Prof. Moreira, op.cit. 
39 MEP Keller, op.cit.  
40 Interview with MEP 1, INTA Committee, European Parliament, 12 April 2012, Brussels.  
41 Pollet-Fort 1, op.cit., p. 10.  
42 Woolcock 3, op.cit., p. 61.  
43 European Union 1, op.cit., Art. 207(2) TFEU.  EU Diplomacy Paper 5/2012 
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EU Trade Policy Actors 
 
In this section, the implications of the post-Lisbon role of the EP will be analysed for 
each of EU trade policy actor, namely the Parliament itself, the Commission and the 
Council of Ministers. 
 
The European Parliament 
“Despite its legal empowerment, Parliament has a priori entered the political arena 
as the weakest of the three institutional players.”44 INTA has not had the chance to 
forge strong working relations with DG TRADE, the TPC and EU Member State’s 
Economic Affairs Attachés, who over the years have developed a strong relationship 
and understanding of each-other. While the TPC meets every Friday, the INTA 
Committee only holds meetings once a month. In trialogue discussions on trade 
issues and also more generally, the EP often finds itself in a disadvantaged position as 
compared to the TPC that  has a much higher level of expertise and expansive 
institutional memory. This lack of technical expertise makes it more difficult for INTA to 
“translate political preferences into credible and well-informed negotiation positions 
vis-à-vis its institutional competitors”.45  
Moreover, there is a huge difference in the number of staff and experts employed by 
DG TRADE and the Parliament’s INTA Committee, and the two institutions have very 
different organisational structures. While DG TRADE operates in a thematic  unit 
structure run by around 600 experts, trade issues in the EP are dealt with at several 
different levels. These include the 31 MEPs sitting on INTA and their assistants, the INTA 
secretariat (with approximately 19 staff), experts from the Parliament’s DG External 
Policies, as well as the trade policy advisors and secretariats of each party group. 
While DG TRADE employs “hierarchically organised experts who are well versed and 
specialised in particular subfields of trade and investment matters”, 46 the INTA 
Committee relies on the trade expertise from all the domains mentioned above, on 
DG TRADE,  as well as clarifications from concerned industries and industry 
representatives. Hence, INTA Committee members may  find themselves at risk of 
being “vulnerable to the siren calls of special-interest lobbying groups that are willing 
                                                 
44 Kleimann, op.cit., p. 13.  
45 Ibid.  
46 Ibid., p. 15.  Laura Richardson 
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to provide ‘counsel’ and ‘technical expertise’ at the high cost of placing 
protectionist items on MEP’s agendas”.47  
 
The European Commission 
Prior to the  Lisbon  Treaty, the Commission, acting as sole negotiator at the 
international level on behalf of the Union, was endowed with a strong degree of 
autonomy. With the EP entering the trade policy field in the post-Lisbon era, the 
Commission has lost a degree of its independence, however, this can also serve to 
strengthen  its bargaining position at the international level. A  public  EP  resolution 
adopted in plenary outlining the conditions for consent can “help the Commission in 
its negotiating position”48 at the international level as the Commission has to explain 
to its negotiating counterpart that the agreement must contain certain EP demands. 
DG TRADE has been “proactive in the establishment of direct inter-institutional 
relations with the  INTA Committee” 49  and has adopted a “‘charm offensive’ 
strategy” 50 to ensure its agenda continues to be supported  by the Parliament. 
Having a supportive EP can be useful in the event of inter-institutional competition on 
a particular dossier between the Commission and the Council or if the Commission 
wishes to crowd out  trade policy lobbyists  against its agenda  from  the  INTA 
Committee.  In this sense, it is in the interest of the Commission that the INTA 
Committee is provided with sufficient documents in order to make  factually 
accurate recommendations on how the EP should vote as a whole on FTAs in the 
plenary. Hence, it is vital that the Commission continues and steps up its efforts to 
provide the INTA Committee with all the relevant information and with no delays.  
 
The Council of Ministers 
In the pre-Lisbon institutional framework, the Council was the only institution with the 
power to decide on trade agreements. Hence, the “lisbonisation of the Council was 
a shock for them and was very demanding as they were used to deciding on their 
own”.51 The Council is likely to be the institution least satisfied with the EP’s enhanced 
trade powers and  has shown relatively little flexibility in adapting to Lisbon-era 
                                                 
47 Ibid., p. 14.  
48 Commission official, op.cit.  
49 Kleimann, op.cit., p. 16.  
50 Ibid.  
51 Prof. Moreira, op.cit.    EU Diplomacy Paper 5/2012 
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realities. 52  Relations between the EP and the Council are governed through 
trialogues, chaired by the Council Presidency, where both institutions negotiate with 
the Commission acting as a mediator or conciliator. In general, relations between 
the Council and the EP have been under strain and the two institutions have not 
succeeded in negotiating a Framework Agreement to facilitate their post-Lisbon 
relations. However, they are heading towards improvement: since the EP acts as a 
co-legislator in the implementation of the CCP, the Council is now obliged to listen to 
it in order to reach any form of agreement. 
The Council Presidencies play a key role in fostering the relationship between the EP 
and the Council. The first Presidency of the Council after the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty (Spanish) invited the INTA Chair to address the TPC at a working lunch. 
Moreira recalls that “this was a premiere: for a number [of TPC members] it was as if 
they were listening to the impact of the Lisbon Treaty for the first time”.53 Two and a 
half years on, relations between both institutions are normalising, the invitation of the 
INTA Chair to working lunches has become a rule, and both sides can only positively 
speak of improvements in their relationship. A  culture of Council/EP relations has 
developed, both at a formal and informal level. Notably, “the Council is increasingly 
speaking [to the EP] with one voice: the voice of the Presidency.”54 While previously 
some Member States attempted to influence the INTA Committee unilaterally, the 
‘single voice’ culture has gained traction in the post-Lisbon era, as the Council and 
EP have developed efficient and transparent channels of communication.  
 
EU Trade Policy Lobbyists 
It is widely understood that “interest representation takes place where decisions are 
made”.55 Up until the Lisbon Treaty, trade policy lobbyists turned to the Commission 
and Council and many perceived the EP as a “phantom Parliament”,56 destitute of 
any real power or influence in external trade matters. The Lisbon Treaty’s inclusion of 
the EP in the EU’s CCP “provides a ‘bully pulpit’ to speak directly to the people of 
Europe” on trade issues.57 Parliamentary engagement in the negotiation of FTAs has 
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the potential of narrowing  the gap between “public political preferences and 
perceptions, on the one hand, and actual EU trade policy on the other”.58 Trade 
policy lobbyists  in the EU, whether they be private sector companies, industry 
representatives, trade unions, NGOs or civil society groups, seem to have understood 
the significance of the new opportunity which the Lisbon Treaty has opened to them 
in enhancing the EP’s role in the CCP.   
Lobbying the EP is challenging due to its political fragmentation and multiple access 
points. Hence, “effective interest representation in the Parliament […] requires wider 
coalitions, better networking, non-technical approaches, combined with an acute 
sense for regional or even local political priorities”.59 MEPs are receptive to different 
trade policy lobbyists depending on their political affiliation and nationality: while 
NGOs usually approach the Greens, trade unions lobby the Socialists and businesses 
focus their efforts on centre-right and right-wing party groups.   
Special interest groups welcome the enhanced role of the EP and understand the 
opportunities this new venue presents for their lobbying strategies. Nevertheless, the 
EP remains the weakest of the three institutional players involved in the negotiation of 
FTAs. The Council therefore remains the ‘best friend’ of many industry representations 
because  Member States understand very clearly issues such as ‘fewer jobs’ and 
‘plant closure’.60 While Member States usually consider the impact of an FTA at the 
national level in terms of strengthening jobs and industries, MEPs, whether they be 
‘free-traders’ at heart or anti-trade, are often predisposed to hold more ‘local’ views. 
These nuances require industry representations to be very fined-tuned to the local 
and regional priorities of individual MEPs in order to lead a successful lobbying 
campaign in the EP. For these reasons, despite the empowerment of the EP in FTA 
negotiations, it seems that business groups will continue to focus most of their 
lobbying efforts on the Council.  
When NGOs and civil society organisations become aware that the EP is to issue a 
resolution, they will attempt to draw its attention to their concerns through speaking 
directly with MEPs and writing letters. Interviewed Green/Left-wing MEPs stressed the 
value of the information which NGOs bring to them, through FTA analyses and 
impact assessment reports on particular industrial and societal sectors, which they 
                                                 
58 Ibid.  
59 Lehmann, op.cit., p. 40.  
60 Telephone interview with ACEA Representative 1, 6 March 2012. EU Diplomacy Paper 5/2012 
  17 
“can then really use […] to try to push their case within the Parliament”.61 While NGOs 
“enjoy relatively good access to decision-makers” 62,  their “impact on the EU’s 
approach to […] negotiations [of the EU-India FTA] has been limited”.63 Green and 
Left-wing MEPs in the EP are receptive to their concerns; however these party groups 
represent a minority within the EP and their voices tend to be drowned in the plenary 
sessions.  
 
FTA Outcomes  
 
This section will i)  examine how EP involvement in FTA negotiations politicises the 
trade policy-making process and ii) assess the extent to which the inclusion of the EP 
results in the negotiation of FTAs with more ‘normative’ outcomes. 
 
The Politicisation of EU Trade Policy  
In its Global Europe strategy, the EU sets out to negotiate FTAs “aiming at the highest 
possible degree of trade liberalisation including far-reaching liberalisation of services 
and investment”.64 In achieving this aim through FTA negotiations, the Commission “is 
faced with trade-offs  across different issues”: 65 gaining market access in these 
competitive sectors implies making concessions which may harm other sectors in the 
EU. In the post-Lisbon era, the EP has proved receptive and has established itself as 
the guardian of vulnerable groups who oppose the conclusion of harmful FTAs. As 
MEP Pablo Zalba Bidegain (EPP) stated, “the will of the European Parliament is to 
defend the interests of our citizens and industries, especially those more affected by 
these agreements. We are open to everybody to share their concerns with us; this is 
our job as the democratic institution of the Union”.66  
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In order to reach its offensive targets for services and investment, DG TRADE granted 
significant concessions to Korean negotiators in the automobile sector. For the first 
time in FTA negotiations, the Commission gave in to what was traditionally one of its 
‘red lines’: the  Korean  demand for a ‘duty drawback’ clause, “which authorises 
Korean producers  to sell to Europe at highly competitive prices cars  made with 
cheap components […] in third countries like China”.67  
Arguing that the motor industry was sacrificed in exchange for access to the Korean 
services market,  the  European Automobile Manufacturers' Association  (ACEA) 
launched a fierce lobbying campaign towards the EP to protect small-car 
manufacturers.  Many MEPs, receptive to these concerns, echoed the industry’s 
rhetoric and succeeded in ratifying the safeguard regulation before it cast its final 
vote on the agreement. In particular, the majority of amendments to protect 
European small-car manufacturers adopted by the INTA Committee when the text of 
the EU-Korea FTA came before it were “proposed by German and Italian INTA 
members, irrespective of party group affiliation”,68 as it is their industries, along with 
the French, that are due to suffer the most from the opening up of their markets to 
Korean automobile imports.  
Essentially, the  Korea Safeguard Regulation  stipulates that “a  safeguard measure 
may be imposed […] where a product originating in Korea [… is] imported into the 
Union […] under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the 
Union industry producing a like or directly competitive product”.69 The real ‘political 
victory’ of the EP against the Commission and Council is contained within the details 
of this Regulation. Here, the EP negotiated under the OLP alongside the Council the 
conditions to be followed in order to invoke the safeguard clause. As many issues 
were already settled in the text of the FTA, “the EP used the safeguard regulation as 
a means to integrate specific provisions to protect concerned interests while at the 
same time staying in compliance with the FTA text”.70  
The  Regulation contains provisions which go quite a degree beyond the mere 
implementation of the safeguard clause. For example, Article 3 on Commission 
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monitoring extends to “the evolution of import and export statistics of Korean 
products in sensitive sectors [cars,  textiles and consumer electronics71]  potentially 
affected by duty drawback [… and] the Commission may consider extending the 
scope of the monitoring to other sectors”.72 The EP also managed to include for the 
first time that investigations “shall be initiated upon request by a Member State, by 
any legal person, or any association not having legal personality, acting on behalf of 
the Union industry”73 whereas previously only the Council had such a power.  
The Regulation imposes many reporting obligations on the Commission that would 
never have been required in a pre-Lisbon setting. Article 13 declares that “the 
Commission shall make public an annual report on the application and 
implementation of the Agreement [… which] shall present a summary of statistics 
and the evolution of trade with Korea. Specific mention shall be made of the results 
of the monitoring of duty drawback.” 74 Within one month from the Commission 
issuing the report, the EP may “invite the Commission to an ad hoc meeting of its 
responsible committee to present and explain any issues related to the 
implementation of the Agreement”. 75 Finally, “upon request by the responsible 
committee of the European Parliament, the Commission shall report to it on any 
specific concerns relating to the implementation by Korea of its commitments on 
non-tariff measures”.76 
The EU-Korea FTA demonstrates that after ratifying the agreement on condition of a 
strong bilateral safeguard clause, the EP tried its best to include as many of the issues 
of concern which had been raised to it by particular sectors into the Regulation 
designed to implement the safeguard  clause.  One such concern was  ‘duty 
drawback’, which – while unrelated to safeguards – has found its way into the text of 
the  Regulation on two occasions. With the EP involved at earlier stages in the 
negotiations of current and future FTAs, it is hoped that such an outcome can be 
avoided, whereby the EP crowds a regulation designed to implement a trade 
remedy with connected and unrelated issues. Increasing involvement of the EP in the 
FTA  negotiation stage and influence over  setting the negotiating  directive could 
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enable the concerns which the EP wishes to protect to be taken into account at an 
earlier stage and hence reflected in the actual text of the FTA.   
The entry into force of the EU-India FTA could have more severe consequences on 
the European automotive industry than the concluded EU-Korea FTA because of 
arbitrary increases in tariffs by the Indian authorities, the sheer size of the Indian 
market and the lower costs of production and labour in the subcontinent. The EP has 
taken on board and echoed these concerns. In its May 2011 resolution on the EU-
India FTA, the EP stresses that “the objective for industrial trade should be reciprocal 
full duty elimination, with asymmetry in timing, and that any possible exception to this 
objective should be limited and subject to review and should not involve the 
exclusion of sectors that are of importance to both sides, such as passenger cars”77 
and that the agreement should include an  “effective safeguard clause”. 78 
Furthermore, in its 2011 Resolution on a New Trade Policy for Europe under the Europe 
2020 Strategy, the EP also emphasises “that FTAs […] should respect key principles 
such as reciprocity, zero for zero tariff dismantling, removal of non-tariff barriers, 
prohibition of duty drawback regimes, and uniform application of a high rules-of-
origin threshold”.79 
The bilateral safeguard clause negotiated in the EU-Korea FTA has been established 
as an example for future agreements. However, while the Commission and EP 
devised some way to take into account the concerns of the motor industry, hence 
solving the political debate in the EU-Korea FTA through this safeguard mechanism, 
the case of India is more complex. For DG TRADE, “the real issue in the EU-India 
negotiations is going to be managing the expectations of our industry” 80  in 
negotiating a sufficiently ambitious FTA for some sectors, which will inevitably be 
asymmetrical and detrimental to others. With  India’s  status as an emerging and 
increasingly competitive economy, an EU-India FTA “which is not fully reciprocal is 
politically difficult”81 because it will face opposition from the European car and other 
industries,  the concerns of which are likely to  yet  again be taken on board and 
defended by the Parliament. With parliamentary involvement throughout the post-
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Lisbon  negotiation process, it will be interesting to see  whether specific sector 
concerns are reflected in the text of the FTA or whether the EP succeeds in better 
guaranteeing their protection during the implementation phase, as was the case 
with the EU-Korea FTA.  
 
More Normative FTAs : Sustainable Development and Core Labour Standards 
The EU’s “aspiration of acting as a normative power through trade has further been 
reinforced by the Lisbon Treaty provisions”.82 Article 21 TFEU subjects EU trade and 
investment policy to the EU’s External Action principles, notably “democracy, the rule 
of law, [...] human rights and fundamental freedoms, [...]  sustainable economic 
development, social and environmental development of  developing countries”.83 
Article 3 TEU holds that the EU’s CCP must contribute “to the sustainable 
development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and 
fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights”.84  
The EP could, “in its role as a political actor endowed with democratic legitimacy, 
become an active promoter of the consistency of CCP content with the principles 
and objectives of EU External Action”.85 Nevertheless, within the Parliament and the 
INTA Committee, the MEPs’ level of attachment to these issues varies significantly. 
While the Green/Left-wing groups believe that policy coherence in development 
(PCD) in trade “is key if the EU really wants to foster development in third countries”,86 
the majority of the EP “only pays lip-services to human rights”87 and some MEPs are of 
the opinion that “trade policy is not a panacea”88 and thus should not be utilised as 
a tool for all EU external relations objectives. Despite these cleavages, it seems that 
there are some PCD issues in the EP that have majority support and find their way 
into the EU’s bilateral trade agreements, notably sustainable development and core 
labour standards. 
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The EU-Korea FTA contains the strongest sustainable development chapter yet to be 
negotiated by the EU in an FTA, which is “broad in scope, containing comprehensive 
commitments regarding labour standards and environmental agreements, including 
an innovative monitoring mechanism with strong civil society involvement”.89 The FTA 
calls upon both negotiating parties to establish ‘Domestic Advisory Groups’, whose 
members “will meet at a Civil Society Forum in order to conduct a dialogue 
encompassing sustainable development aspects of trade relations between the 
parties”.90 In addition, the EU-Korea FTA is the first bilateral agreement between the 
EU and a third state, which makes reference to their joint commitment “to reaching 
the ultimate objective of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change and its Kyoto Protocol”.91  
While Korea, an industrialised country with the same level of engagement as the EU 
was forthcoming with regard a strong sustainable development chapter, an issue 
which proved controversial in Korea was the ratification of the International Labour 
Organisation’s (ILO) Conventions and commitment to its core labour standards.92 The 
Socialist group in the EP was particularly keen to see these standards included in the 
agreement. As a result, the principles of the ILO Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Right at Work 1998 are enshrined in the FTA. 
As it was excluded from the negotiations, the EP is not mentioned and was not 
granted any oversight power for sustainable development in the text of the EU-Korea 
FTA. Nevertheless, it succeeded  in asserting itself through its new implementation 
powers.  The EP  managed to include  in the Safeguard Regulation a provision 
stipulating  that the Commission’s implementation report shall contain ‘special 
sections’, which “deal with the fulfilment of obligations under Chapter 13 
(Sustainable Development) of the Agreement and with the activities of the Domestic 
Advisory Group and the Civil Society Forum”.93 What is more, in Annex I  of the 
Regulation, the Commission’s Statement declares that the latter will attach 
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“particular importance to the effective implementation of commitments on labour 
and environmental standards of Chapter 13 of the FTA”,94 the implementation of 
which “shall be duly documented and reported to the European Parliament and 
Council”.95   
Parliamentary dissatisfaction with the findings of the report on sustainable 
development stands as grounds whereby the EP can “invite the Commission to an 
ad hoc meeting of its responsible committee to present and explain any issues 
related to the implementation of the agreement”.96 The widening of the Safeguard 
Regulation to include a sustainable development reporting mechanism is a real 
political win for the EP as a result of its enhanced powers in the implementation 
phase and enforcement of bilateral FTAs.  
While the Commission faced little obstacles with regard to sustainable development 
in the EU-Korea FTA negotiations, the situation is very different in the case of India, 
which has severe development concerns at stake. The Indian government, not 
wanting to compromise its country’s economic growth,  fiercely opposes the 
negotiation of a strong sustainable development chapter. In a pre-Lisbon situation, it 
is more likely that the Commission and the Council would have given in to their 
Indian counterparts and settled for a weak and symbolic sustainable development 
chapter. However, the EP recognises that such a chapter “is an essential part of any 
EU FTA and calls on both sides to agree to an ambitious chapter which reflects the 
common commitment to promoting sustainable development and inclusive 
growth”.97 The EP wants to see this chapter to cover, “as a minimum, compliance 
with the ILO’s eight core conventions and four priority conventions and 
internationally agreed environmental standards, and also provide incentives to 
enterprises to enter into CSR [corporate social responsibility] commitments”.98  
Whereas the Commission would have been more flexible and settled for the Indian 
demand of a watered-down version in the pre-Lisbon era, it “has become crystal 
clear” 99  with the EP in the game  that the Commission must make  its Indian 
counterparts understand that they are obliged to accept a strong sustainable 
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development chapter unless they want to see the agreement voted down by the 
European Parliament.  
 
Conclusions  
 
In the post-Lisbon era, the EP is endowed with strong new powers and “there is a risk 
to overshoot or undershoot”.100 Two and a half years on, all actors engaged in FTA 
negotiations remain in the midst of discovering what the inclusion of the EP on the 
playing field means for the EU’s CCP. Nevertheless, a few preliminary conclusions 
can be drawn relating to the implications of the post-Lisbon role of the EP for EU 
bilateral trade negotiations.  
With regard to processes, the EP is now endowed with the ‘hard power’ of consent in 
the ratification phase of FTAs, and this acts as a sufficient threat to strengthen the 
EP’s ‘soft power’ to influence the negotiation phase. While the treaty does not grant 
the EP any formal powers in the drafting of the negotiating directive, it seems the EP 
may develop strategies to influence the mandate. Finally, the EP now plays an 
important role in the implementation of FTAs under the OLP. 
The post-Lisbon enhanced role of the EP has significant implications for EU trade 
policy actors. The Commission has lost a degree of autonomy as chief negotiator 
and must engage effectively with the EP in order to avoid parliamentary dissent at 
the ratification stage. The Council, initially reluctant to share its trade powers with the 
EP, has realised that EU trade policy, in particular its implementation, cannot 
advance without cooperation between both institutions. In addition, the enhanced 
powers of the EP in the post-Lisbon era have opened it up as a new point of access 
for trade policy lobbyists.  
Finally, the increased involvement of the EP in the negotiation of FTAs has significant 
implications for the outcome of EU bilateral trade agreements. The post-Lisbon era is 
characterised by i) a politicisation of EU trade policy whereby the EP defends the 
interests of European citizens and industries in FTA negotiations, and ii) greater 
normative outcomes of FTAs as the EP is in possession of greater power and tools to 
translate the social agenda of MEPs and NGOs into EU trade agreements. 
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